Beyond matroids: Secretary Problem and Prophet Inequality with general
  constraints by Rubinstein, Aviad
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
00
35
7v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  1
 A
pr
 20
16
Beyond matroids: secretary problem and prophet inequality
with general constraints.
Aviad Rubinstein∗
April 4, 2016
Abstract
We study generalizations of the “Prophet Inequality” and “Secretary Problem”, where
the algorithm is restricted to an arbitrary downward-closed set system. For {0, 1} val-
ues, we give O (logn)-competitive algorithms for both problems. This is close to the
Ω (logn/ log log n) lower bound due to Babaioff, Immorlica, and Kleinberg [3]. For gen-
eral values, our results translate to O (logn · log r)-competitive algorithms, where r is the
cardinality of the largest feasible set. This resolves (up to the O (log r · log logn) factors)
an open question posed to us by Bobby Kleinberg [13].
1 Introduction
The “Secretary Problem” and “Prophet Inequality” and their variants have been central prob-
lems in optimal stopping theory for decades. In both problems, an online decision maker
selects one of n items that arrive online. The decision maker observes only one item at a
time, and must decide immediately and irrevocably whether to select this item. The expected
value of the item selected by the decision maker is compared to the offline optimum. There is
little that an online algorithm can do in an arbitrary worst case, so the input is restricted: In
the Secretary Problem, the values of items are chosen adversarially, but their arrival order is
random. In Prophet Inequality, the order is adversarial, but the values are drawn from known,
independent but not identical distributions. Algorithms with optimal competitive ratios (with
respect to the offline optimum) of e and 2 were known since the 1960’s (e.g. [6]) and 1970’s
[14], respectively.
In the past decade, variants of both problems received significant attention from theoret-
ical computer scientists thanks to their rich algorithmic structure and applications to online
and offline mechanism design (e.g. [2, 10, 12]). In particular, there have been many works
on settings where the decision maker is allowed to select any subset of the items subject to
a certain family of combinatorial constraints. In the famous “Matroid Secretary Problem”
[3], for example, the decision maker is allowed to select any independent set in a given ma-
troid. Obtaining a constant competitive ratio algorithm is a long-standing open problem:
the state of the art is O (log log r), where r is the rank of the matroid [15, 7]. Its cousin,
the “Matroid Prophet Inequality”, has been resolved by Kleinberg and Weinberg who gave a
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2-competitive algorithm [12]. Other constraints such as special classes of matroids ([4] and
references therein), polymatroids [5], etc. have also been studied in these settings. Even the
2013 survey by Dinitz [4] seems outdated with so much exciting progress in the last couple of
years (e.g. [1, 8, 11, 17]).
Our results
In this work we revisit an important missing piece in this puzzle: what happens when there
are no guarantees on the family of feasible sets? Babaioff, Immorlica, and Kleinberg [3] gave
an Ω (log n/ log log n) lower bound1 on the competitive ratio of the Secretary Problem with
arbitrary downward-closed constraints, even in the special case where all values are in {0, 1}.
(Essentially the same construction gives the same lower bound for the corresponding Prophet
Inequality; see also Appendix B.) Beyond this lower bound, the problem remained poorly
understood. In particular there was a disturbing lack of upper bounds on the competitive ratio
- nothing beyond the trivial O (n) was known. Here, we make significant progress towards
closing this gap:
Theorem (Main Theorem). When the items take values in {0, 1}, the competitive ratios for
Downward-Closed Prophet and Downward-Closed Secretary are O (log n).
For general (non-negative) valuations, we can reduce to the {0, 1}-valued case with a loss
of O (log r), where r denotes the cardinality of the largest feasible set.
Corollary. For general item values, the competitive ratios for Downward-closed Prophet
and Downward-Closed Secretary are O (log n · log r).
Computational Efficiency Our algorithm for Downward-Closed Secretary assumes
access to a demand-like oracle. The algorithm for Downward-Closed Prophet makes
slightly more complicated queries of the form: “conditioning on the history of realizations
and items selected by the algorithm so far, what is the probability that the prophet can still
obtain value τ?”. Our algorithms are efficient assuming access to such oracles. Note that it
is unreasonable to expect much more: optimizing over arbitrary families of downward-closed
sets is computationally intractable even in the offline case (for example, when the feasible sets
are the independent sets of a graph [13]).
Non-monotone feasibility constraints One can further generalize the problem and con-
sider feasibility constraints which are not even downward-closed. In Section 4 we briefly
discuss Non-monotone Prophet and Non-monotone Secretary and prove near tight
lower bounds on the competitive ratios.
1.1 Techniques
Both algorithms rely on potential function argument. The key idea for the analysis of
Downward-closed Prophet is the use of a dynamic potential function: when the al-
gorithm cannot guarantee adequate progress with respect to the current potential function,
1Stated in terms of the r, the maximum size of a feasible set, [3]’s construction gives an Ω (r)-lower bound
on the competitive ratio; one can easily obtain a matching O (r)-upper bound by applying the algorithms for
the classical (single item) variants of both problems.
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it dynamically modifies the potential function. We believe that this simple idea will find
applications in other potential function arguments.
We note that our algorithms forDownward-closed Prophet and Downward-Closed
Secretary bear little resemblance to each other or to related works on the Matroid Secre-
tary Problem and Matroid Prophet Inequality. In particular, we focus on the case of {0, 1}-
valued items, which is easy for matroids. Defying our intuition from matroids again, our
algorithm and analysis for Downward-closed Secretary happens to be simpler than
that of Downward-Closed Prophet. Nevertheless, we begin with Downward-Closed
Prophet in the next section, as we find the techniques more exciting. The algorithm for
Downward-closed Secretary is described in Section 3 and non-monotone constraints are
discussed in Section 4.
2 Prophet
Definition 1 (Downward-Closed Prophet). Consider n items with independently dis-
tributed values {Xi ∼ Di}ni=1. Let F be an arbitrary downward-closed set system over the
items [n], and initialize W as the empty set. The algorithm receives as input n, F , and the
distributions, and observes the realizations (the value of Xi) online. After observing the real-
ization of Xi, the algorithm must decide (immediately and irrevocably) whether to add i to
the set W , subject to the constraint that W remains a feasible set in F . The objective is to
maximize the sum of values of items in W .
Theorem 1. When the Xi’s take values in {0, 1}, there is a deterministic algorithm for
Downward-Closed Prophet that achieves a competitive ratio of O (log n).
Let r denote the maximum cardinality of a feasible set S ∈ F .
Corollary 1. There is a deterministic algorithm for Downward-Closed Prophet that
achieves a competitive ratio of O (log n · log r).
Proof of Corollary 1 from Theorem 1. We recover separately the contributions from “tail” events
(a single item taking an exceptionally high value) and the “core” contribution that is spread
over many items. Run the better of the following two algorithms:
Tail Let OPT denote the expected offline optimum value. Whenever we see an item with
value at least 2OPT , we select it. For item i, let pi = Pr [Xi ≥ 2OPT ]. We have
OPT ≥ 2OPT · Pr [∃i : Xi ≥ 2OPT ] = 2OPT ·
(
1−
∏
(1− pi)
)
.
Dividing by OPT and rearranging, we get
1/2 ≤
∏
(1− pi) ≤ e−
∑
pi ,
and thus ∑
pi ≤ ln 2.
Therefore the probability that we want to take an item but can’t is at most ln 2, so
this algorithm achieves at least a (1− ln 2)-fraction of the expected contribution from values
greater than 2OPT .
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Core Observe that we can safely ignore values less than OPT/2r, as those can contribute a
total of at most OPT/2. Partition all remaining values into log r+2 intervals [OPT/2r,OPT/r] ,
. . . , [OPT, 2OPT ]. The expected contribution from the values in each interval is a Ω (1/ log r)-
fraction of the expected offline optimum without values greater than 2OPT . Pick the interval
with the largest expected contribution, round down all the values in this interval, and run the
algorithm guaranteed by Theorem 1. This achieves an Ω
(
1
logn·log r
)
-fraction of the expected
contribution from values less than or equal to 2OPT .
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
2.1 A dynamic potential function
A natural approach to solvingDownward-Closed Prophet is the following meta-algorithm:
wait for an item with value 1, and select it if that does not decrease some potential function.
In Appendix C we informally discuss a few intuitive potential functions and the difficulties
that arise in analyzing each of them. Here we go directly to the remedy to those obstacles: a
“dynamic” potential function.
The basic question we want to ask about a new item is the following: given the realizations
we have observed so far and items we have already selected, is it a good idea to select this
item? The main challenge is to come up with an analyzable proxy to “good idea”. To this
end, we consider a restricted prophet who is committed to past decisions -and must also select
the current item- but is omniscient about future realizations; we maintain a target value τ ,
and ask what is the probability over future realizations that the restricted prophet can obtain
a solution with value τ . The main novelty in our analysis is that we dynamically update
τ . In particular, as the prophet becomes more restricted by accumulating commitments, we
compare his solution’s value to a lower target τ .
At each iteration, the algorithm maintains a target value τ and a target probability π; π
is the probability (over future realizations) that the current restricted prophet beats τ . We
say that an item is good if selecting it does not decrease the probability of beating the target
value by a factor greater than n2, and bad otherwise. Notice that all the bad items together
contribute at most a (1/n)-fraction of the probability of beating τ . As we mentioned above,
a key ingredient is that τ is updated dynamically. If the probability of observing a good item
with value 1 is too low (less than 1/3), we deduct 1 from τ . We show (Lemma 2) that this
increases π by a factor of at least 2. π decreases by an n2 factor when we select an item, and
increases by a factor of 2 whenever we deduct 1 from τ : we balance 2 log n deductions for
every item the algorithm selects, and this gives the O (log n) competitive ratio.
So far our algorithm is roughly as follows: set a target value τ ; whenever the probability π
of reaching the target τ drops below 1/3, decrease τ ; if π > 1/3, sit and wait for a good item
with value 1 - one will arrive with probability at least 1/3− o (1). There is one more subtlety:
what should the algorithm do if all the good items have value 0? In other words, what if
the probability of observing a good item with value 1 is neither very low nor very close to 1,
say 1/2 or even 1− 1logn? On one hand, we can’t decrease τ again, because we are no longer
guaranteed a significant increase in π; on the other hand, after, say Θ
(
log2 n
)
iterations, we
still have a high probability of having an iteration where none of the good items has value
1. (If no good 1’s are coming, we don’t want the algorithm to wait forever...) Fortunately,
there is a simple solution: the algorithm waits for the last good item; if, against the odds, no
1’s have yet been observed, the algorithm “hallucinates” that this last item has value 1, and
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selects it. In expectation, at most a constant fraction of the items we select will have value 0,
so the competitive ratio is still O (log n).
2.2 Formal description of the algorithm
Notation
We let OPT denote the expected (offline) optimum. W is the set of items selected so far (W
for “Wins”), and ℓW , max {i ∈W} is the index of the last selected item.
Let F denote the family of all feasible sets. Similarly, FW is the family of feasible sets
that contain W , and FW+j , FW∪{j} is the family of feasible sets that contain W ∪ {j}.
Let Xi denote the random value of the i-th item. We use zi to refer to the observed
realization of Xi. We let V
(F ,X[n]) , maxS∈F∑i∈S Xi denote the value of optimum offline
solution (note that this is also a random variable).
Let τ = τ (W ) be the current target value, and π = π (τ,W ) denotes the target probability:
π (τ,W ) , Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] .
We also define πj = πj (τ,W ) to be the probability of reaching τ , given that j is the next
item we select. Formally,
πj (τ,W ) , Pr
V (FW+j,X[n]) > τ | X[j] =
z[ℓW ], 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓ
W
+1,...,j−1
, 1
 .
We say that a future item is good (and bad otherwise) if πj ≥ n−2 · π. Finally, G =
G (τ, π,W ) ,
{
j > ℓW : π
j ≥ n−2 · π} ∩ (⋃S∈FW S) is the set of items that are both good
and feasible, and A = A (G) ,
(∨
j∈GXj = 1
)
is the event that at least one of the good items
has value 1.
(See also list of symbols in Appendix A.)
Algorithm
Initialize τ ← OPT/2 and W ← ∅.
After each update to W , decrease τ until Pr [A] ≥ 1/3, or until |W | > τ . When Pr [A] ≥
1/3, reveal the values of items until observing a good item (i.e. some j ∈ G) with value 1.
When we observe a good item with value 1, add it to W . If we reached the last good item
without observing any good items with value 1, add the last good item to G and subtract 1
from τ . See also pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
2.3 Analysis
Concentration
We want to argue that the value of the optimum concentrates around its expectation. Proving
concentration for a maximum over an arbitrary family of sets’ sums is rather non-trivial. For-
tunately, there is a vast literature on concentration bounds for suprema of empirical processes.
We use the following inequality due to Ledoux. (It is particularly convenient because the de-
nominator in the exponent depends on the expected supremum rather on absolute bounds on
the values each item can take.)
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Algorithm 1 Prophet
1. τ ← OPT2 ; W ← ∅
2. while τ > |W |:
(a) π ← Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]]
# π is the probability that, given the history, the offline optimum can still beat τ .
(b) G← {j > ℓW : πj ≥ n−2 · π} ∩ (⋃S∈FW S)
# G is the set of good and feasible items.
(c) if Pr [A] ≥ 1/3
# A good item with value 1 is likely to arrive.
i. j∗ ← min {j ∈ G : zj = 1}
# Wait for a good and feasible item with value 1.
ii. if j∗ =∞
# All good items have value 0.
A. j∗ ← maxG
# Select the last item anyway.
B. τ ← τ − 1
# Adjust the target value to account for select an item with value 0
iii. W ←W ∪ {j∗}
(d) else
i. τ ← τ − 1
# decrease target value τ until Pr [A] ≥ 1/3.
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Theorem 2. [16, Theorem 2.4] There exists some constant K > 0 such that the follow-
ing holds. Let Yi’s be independent (but not necessarily identical) random variables in some
space S; let C be a countable class of measurable functions f : S → [0, 1]; and let Z =
supf∈C
∑n
i=1 f (Yi). Then,
Pr [Z ≥ E [Z] + t] ≤ exp
(
− t
K
· log
(
1 +
t
E [Z]
))
.
To make the connection to our setting, let Yi be the vector in [0, 1]
|F| whose S-th coordinate
is Xi if i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. Let fS (Yi) , [Yi]S , so
∑n
i=1 fS (Yi) is simply the value of set
S. Let C , {fS}S∈F . The above concentration inequality can now be written as
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] ≤ exp(− tK · log
(
1 +
t
OPT
))
. (1)
In fact, we only need the following much weaker lemma. Notice that we can assume
without loss of generality that OPT ≥ log n; otherwise the trivial greedy algorithm guarantees
an expected value of Ω (min {OPT, 1}) = Ω (OPT/ log n).
Lemma 1. Assume OPT ≥ Ω (log n). Then,
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT2
]
> 1/4.
Proof. We have,
OPT =
ˆ ∞
−OPT
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt, (2)
which can be decomposed as to integrals over [−OPT,−OPT/2], [−OPT/2, OPT ], and
[OPT,∞].
The first two integrals can be easily bounded as
ˆ −OPT/2
−OPT
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt ≤ ˆ −OPT/2
−OPT
1 · dt ≤ OPT
2
and
ˆ OPT
−OPT/2
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt ≤ ˆ OPT
−OPT/2
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT/2] dt
≤ 3OPT
2
· Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) > OPT2
]
.
For the third integral we use the concentration bound (1):
ˆ ∞
OPT
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt ≤ ˆ ∞
OPT
exp
(
− t
K
· log
(
1 +
t
OPT
))
dt
≤
ˆ ∞
OPT
exp
(
− t
K
)
dt
=
[
Ke−t/K
]∞
OPT
= K · e−OPT/K ,
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which is negligible since OPT = ω (1).
Plugging into (2), we have:
OPT ≤ OPT
2
+
3OPT
2
· Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) > OPT2
]
+ o (1) ,
and after rearranging we get
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) > OPT2
]
≥ 1/3− o (1) .
Main lemma
Lemma 2. At any point during the run of the algorithm, if Pr [A] ≤ 1/3, then subtracting 1
from τ doubles π; i.e.
Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ − 1 | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] ≥ 2Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] .
Proof. We first claim that the probability that the optimum solution (conditioned on the items
W we already selected and the realizations z[ℓW ] we have already seen) reaches τ without
selecting any items from G is negligible with respect to the total probability of reaching τ .
For each k /∈ G, we have, by definition of G,
Pr
[
V
(FW+k,X[n]) > τ | X[k] = (z[ℓW ], 0 . . . 0, 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
πk
< n−2·Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
π
.
However, if Xj = 0 for all j ∈ G (i.e. if event A does not happen), the first item that
contributes to the optimum solution has to be some k /∈ G. Thus the probability that it still
reaches τ is very small:
Pr
[(
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ) ∧ (¬A) | (X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ])] ≤∑
k/∈G
Pr
[(FW+k,X[n]) > τ | X[k] = (z[ℓW ], 0 . . . 0, 1)]
≤ n−1 · Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] .
In particular, most of the probability of reaching τ comes from the event A (i.e. Xj = 1 for
some j ∈ G):
Pr
[(
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ) ∧A | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] ≥ (1− n−1)Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] .
Inconveniently, this does not guarantee that Pr [A] is large, because the probability of
reaching τ may be very small to begin with, and those events are not independent. Instead,
rewrite the LHS of the above equation as
Pr
[(
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ) ∧A | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] = Pr [A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1/3
Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ | (X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]) ∧A]
By the premise, this implies a strong lower bound on the second term on the RHS. Finally, we
claim that conditioning on A can contribute at most 1 to the optimum V
(Fw,X[n]). Assuming
this claim, the proof of the lemma is complete:
Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ − 1 | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]]≥ Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | (X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]) ∧A] (3)
≥ (3− o (1)) Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] .
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It remains to prove (3). Rewrite A as a disjoint union of the events Aj ,
(
Xj = 1
∧
i<j
i∈G
Xi = 0
)
,
i.e. Aj is the event that j is the first good item with value 1. Let πA denote the probability
of beating the target value conditioning on the history and event A, and analogously for πAj :
πA , Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ] ∧A]
πAj , Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ] ∧Aj] .
Let Bj ,
(
Xj = 0
∧
i<j
i∈G
Xi = 0
)
be the event that neither the j-th item nor any of the
preceding good items have value 1. Changing the value of Xj can decrease the final value of
the solution by at most 1. Thus, for every j,
πAj ≤ Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ − 1 | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ] ∧Bj]
≤ Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ − 1 | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] ,
where the last inequality follows because conditioning on Bj can only decrease the probability
of reaching the target value.
Finally, since A is a disjoint union of the Aj ’s, it follows that πA is a convex combination
of the πAj ’s. Therefore,
Pr
[
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ] ∧A] = πA ≤ Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ − 1 | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] .
Putting it all together
Lemma 3. At any point during the run of the algorithm,
τ ≥ OPT
2
− (2 log n+ 1) · |W | − 2
Proof. We prove by induction that at any point during the run of the algorithm,
log π ≥ −2− (2 log n+ 1) · |W |+
(
OPT
2
− τ
)
. (4)
After initialization, log π ≥ −2 by Lemma 1. By definition of G, whenever we add an item to
W , we decrease log π by at most 2 log n - hence the 2 log n · |W | term. Notice that when the
algorithm “hallucinates” a 1, we also decrease τ by 1 to correct for the hallucination - at any
point during the run of the algorithm, this has happened at most |W | times. Recall that we
may also decrease τ in the last line of Algorithm 1 (in order to increase π); whenever we do
this, τ decreases by 1, but π doubles (by Lemma 2), so log π increases by 1, and Inequality
(4) is preserved.
Finally, since π is a probability, we always maintain log π ≤ 0.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The algorithm always terminates after at most O (OPT ) decreases to
the value of τ . By Lemma 3, when the algorithm terminates, we have |W | ≥ τ ≥ OPT2 −
(2 log n+ 1) · |W | − 2, and therefore in particular |W | ≥ OPT−44 logn+4 .
Finally, recall that sometimes the algorithm “hallucinates” good realizations, i.e. for some
items i ∈ W that we select, Xi = 0. However, each time we add an item, the probability
that we add a zero-value item is at most 2/3 (by the condition Pr [A] > 1/3). Therefore in
expectation the value of the algorithm is at least |W | /3.
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3 Secretary
We now discuss our algorithm for the Downward-Closed Secretary problem. Recall
that as we mentioned earlier, it is very different from our algorithm for Downward-Closed
Prophet.
Definition 2 (Downward-Closed Secretary). Consider n items with values {yi} and
an arbitrary downward-closed set system F over the items; both {yi} and F are adversarially
chosen. The algorithm receives as input n (but not F or {yi}). The items arrive in a uniformly
random order. Initialize W as the empty set. When item i arrives, the algorithm observes
its value and all feasible sets it forms with items that have previously arrived. The algorithm
then decides (immediately and irrevocably) whether to add i to the set W , subject to the
constraint that W remains a feasible set in F . The goal is to maximize the sum of values of
items in W .
We remark that our analysis for the {0, 1}-valued case does not require a uniformly random
arrival order. Rather, partition the time intervals into pairs {j, n/2 + j}; the items can be
assigned arbitrarily to pairs of arriving times, and we only require that the choice of which of
the two items arrives at time j and which at time n/2 + j is random.
Theorem 3. When yi ∈ {0, 1} for all i, there is a deterministic algorithm for Downward-
Closed Secretary that achieves a competitive ratio of O (log n).
Let r denote the maximum cardinality of a feasible set S ∈ F .
Corollary 2. For general valuations, there is a randomized algorithm for Downward-Closed
Secretary that achieves a competitive ratio of O (log n · log r).
Proof of Corollary 2 from Theorem 3. Run the classic secretary algorithm over the first n/2
items. With constant probability the algorithm selects the item with the largest value, which
we denote by M .
Also, with constant probability the algorithm sees the item with the largest value too
early and does not select it. Assume that this is the case. Since we obtained expected value
of Ω (M) on the first n/2 items we can, without loss of generality, ignore values less than
M/r. Partition all remaining values into log r interval-buckets [M/r, 2M/r] , . . . , [M/2,M ]; in
expectation, each contributes a (1/ log r)-fraction of the optimum. Choose a bucket at random,
round all the values in it to 1 and set the rest to 0. Finally, run the O (log n)-competitive
algorithm from Theorem 3 on the last n/2 items. (We remark that the choice of bucket can
be derandomized using the random order of the first n/2 items.)
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.
3.1 Secretary algorithm
We run a greedy algorithm over a sliding window of size n/2. At first, we have a fully offline
solution (none of which we actually select) over the first n/2 items. We gradually transform
it into a real online solution over the last n/2 items.
Intuitively, we test how well each item interacts with the previous n/2 items to estimate
how well it would interact with future items. The main challenge is that we reuse the same
randomness from the previous items over and over, and we may overfit our choices to the past.
We overcome this by showing that the probability that the previous items do not represent the
10
Algorithm 2 Secretary
1. W ← ∅; U ← ∅
# Exploration phase:
2. for j ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}:
(a) U ← U ∪ {σj}
3. τ ← V (F ;U) /500 log n
# Exploitation phase:
4. for j ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}:
(a) U ← U \ {σj}
(b) if V
(
FW∪{σn/2+j};U ∪W ∪
{
σn/2+j
})
> V (FW ;U ∪W )
# does item σn/2+j contribute to the best feasible set?
i. W ←W ∪ {σn/2+j}
# if so, add it to W
(c) if |W | ≥ τ
i. return W
future is very small - so small that we can take a union bound over all the potential actions
of our algorithm. Roughly speaking, our main argument only uses 1 bit of randomness for
each item in the optimal offline solution (does it arrive in one of the first n/2 time periods?),
so we cannot expect any concentration inequality to bound the deviations to probability less
than 2−OPT . On the other hand, if our algorithm selects τ items, we have to take a union
bound over
(
n
τ
)
sets, so we want 2−OPT · (nτ)≪ 1. Taking τ ≈ OPT/ log n gives the promised
competitive ratio.
Notation For any set T , we let V (F ;T ) denote the value of the offline optimum solution
restricted to T . We let FW denote the feasible sets that contain W , and finally V (FW ;T )
denotes the value of the offline optimum among feasible sets that contain W and are contained
in T . We use σ to denote the order of arrivals; in particular, σj is the item that arrives in the
j-th time period.
Algorithm In the exploration phase, we observe the first n/2 items and add none of them
to W ; we initialize U as the set of those items (notice that U needs not be a feasible set), and
set our target value to τ , V (F ;U) /500 log n. In the exploitation phase, before observing the
(n/2 + j)-th item, we “forget” the j-th item, i.e. we permanently remove σj from U . Then, we
add the σn/2+j to W iff V
(
FW∪{σn/2+j};U ∪W ∪
{
σn/2+j
})
> V (FW ;U ∪W ). Continue
until |W | = τ or until all items have been revealed. (Of course, aborting when |W | = τ can
only hurt the expected value of the solution, but this simplifies the analysis by restricting the
loss from taking a union bound.) See also pseudocode in Algorithm 2.
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3.2 Analysis
Setup Our analysis compares the number of times the value of the current solution decreases
when we forget σj (“bad” events), with the number of “good” events, where the value of the
current solution increases when we add σn/2+j .
Let Uj denote the set U after we remove the j-th item, i.e. Uj ,
{
σj+1, . . . , σn/2
}
. We
henceforth let W refer to the set returned by the algorithm; for intermediate values, we let
Wj denote the set W before we consider item σn/2+j , i.e. Wj , W ∩
{
σn/2+1, . . . , σn/2+j−1
}
.
We want to take a union bound over all choices the algorithm could have made. Fix any
choice of feasible set Ŵ of size at most τ and a choice σ̂ |
Ŵ
of arrival times for those items.
For any j, let Ŵj , Ŵ ∩
{
σ̂n/2+1, . . . , σ̂n/2+j−1
}
. For each j, let Bj
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))
(B for “bad”)
be the event that forgetting σj decreases the value of the current solution, i.e.
Bj
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))
,
{
1 V
(
F
Ŵj∪{σj}
;Uj ∪ Ŵj ∪ {σj}
)
> V
(
F
Ŵj
;Uj ∪ Ŵj
)
0 otherwise
;
similarly, let Gj
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))
(G for “good”) denote the event that adding σn/2+j increases
the value of the current solution,
Gj
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))
,
1 V
(
F
Ŵj∪{σn/2+j};Uj ∪ Ŵj ∪
{
σn/2+j
})
> V
(
F
Ŵj
;Uj ∪ Ŵj
)
0 otherwise
.
By symmetry, we have that
Pr
[
Bj
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))]
= Pr
[
Gj
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))]
. (5)
When the choice of
(
Ŵ ,
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
))
is clear from the context, we will simply write Bj and Gj ;
we abuse notation and also use Bj and Gj to denote the corresponding indicator random
variables. Notice also that we do not require that σ agrees with σ̂, and the unions in the
definitions of Bj and Gj may not be disjoint unions.
We will of course be interested in the special case where Ŵ = W and σ̂ agrees with σ.
Notice that as long as we have not reached the target value τ , the algorithm selects every j
for which the good event Gj (W, (σ |W )) occurs. Thus, the value of our solution is
|W | = min
{
τ,
∑
Gj (W, (σ |W ))
}
. (6)
Furthermore, the value of the current solution decreases
∑
Bj (W, (σ |W )) times, and increases
|W | times. At the beginning, the value is V (F ;U0) and at the end it is |W |. Canceling |W |
from both sides of the equation, we get
V (F ;U0) =
∑
Bj (W, (σ |W )) . (7)
Our goal is henceforth to lower bound
∑
Gj in terms of
∑
Bj for all choices of Ŵ and(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
)
simultaneously. For the special case where Ŵ = W and
(
σ̂ |
Ŵ
)
= (σ |W ), this will in
particular imply a lower bound on |W | in terms of V (F ;U0).
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Concentration We will use the following martingale version of Bennett’s inequality. (The
main advantage over the more popular Azuma’s inequality is that this theorem depends on
the variance rather than an absolute bound on the values each variable can take.)
Theorem 4. [e.g. [9]] Let (Ω,H, µ) be a probability triple, with H0 ⊆ H1 ⊆ . . . an in-
creasing sequence of sub-σ-fields of H. For each k = 1, 2, . . . let Xk be an Hk-measurable
random variable satisfying |Xk| ≤ 1 and E [Xk | Hk−1] = 0. Let Sn ,
∑n
k=1Xk and Tn ,∑n
k=1 E
[
X2k | Hk−1
]
. Then, for every a, b > 0,
Pr [(Sn ≥ a) ∧ (Tn ≤ b)] ≤ exp
( −a2
2 (a+ b)
)
.
Main argument For the analysis, we reveal the items in a special order: at step 0 we
reveal the pairs
{
σj, σn/2+j
}
unordered, i.e. we reveal all the information up to the last n/2
random bits which determine which item arrives at time j, and which at time n/2 + j. (This
information corresponds to H0 in Theorem 4.) In fact, those pairs can be chosen adversarially.
Then, we reveal the pairs in reverse order, beginning with
(
σn/2, σn
)
. (The knowledge of the
last k pairs corresponds to Hk.)
Fix some choice of Ŵ and σ̂ |
Ŵ
. For k = 1, . . . , n/2, let Xk , Bn/2−k+1−Gn/2−k+1. Since
we fixed Ŵj and
(
σ̂ |
Ŵj
)
in advance, (5) implies that the Xk’s satisfy E [Xk | Hk−1] = 0 as
required in the premise of Theorem 4.
By definition, Sn =
∑
(Bj −Gj). Also, for any k we have that E
[
X2k | Hk−1
]
= 1 if (ex-
actly) one of
{
σn/2−k+1, σn−k+1
}
affects the value of the current solution, and E
[
X2k | Hk−1
]
=
0 otherwise. Thus
Tn ≤
∑
(Bj +Gj) ≤ V (F ; [n]) +
∑
Gj ,
where the second inequality follows from (7); in particular, if
∑
Bj ≥
∑
Gj , we have that
Tn ≤ 2V (F ; [n]). Theorem 4 now gives
Pr
[∑
(Bj −Gj) ≥ V (F ; [n]) /6
]
= Pr [(Sn ≥ V (F ; [n]) /6) ∧ (Tn ≤ 2V (F ; [n]))]
≤ exp
(−V (F ; [n])
156
)
.
Taking union bound over all
(n
τ
)2 ≤ n2τ choices of Ŵ and σ̂ |
Ŵ
, we get that with high
probability, for all of those choices simultaneously
∑
(Bj −Gj) ≤ V (F ; [n]) /6. In particular,
with high probability, ∑
Gj (W, (σ |W )) ≥ V (F ;U0)− V (F ; [n]) /6.
Furthermore, with probability at least 1/2,
V (F ;U0) ≥ V (F ; [n]) /2,
in which case our algorithm’s solution has value at least τ ≥ V (F ; [n]) /1000 log n.
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4 Non-monotone feasibility constraints
Let Non-monotone Prophet be the analogous variant of Downward-Closed Prophet
when the feasibility constraint is not even guaranteed to be downward-closed. Since the
feasibility constraint is non-monotone, let us explicitly assume that all item values are non-
negative.
Theorem 5. The competitive ratio for Non-monotone Prophet with non-negative values
is Θ(n).
Proof. Our algorithm simply selects any feasible set that contains the item with the largest
expected contribution. Observe that this achieves at least OPT/n in expectation.
We now prove an Ω (n) lower bound on the competitive ratio. For every i ∈ [n/2], the
set {i, n/2 + i} is feasible (and these are the only feasible sets). Also, let Xi = 0 always,
and Xn/2+i =
{
1 w.p. 1/n
0 otherwise
. Any online algorithm must commit to some {i, n/2 + i} before
observing any of the Xn/2+i’s, and thus has expected value of 1/n. The offline optimum, on
the other hand, is 1− (1− 1/n)n ≈ 1− 1/e.
For the Secretary Problem, there are several ways to generalize to non-monotone feasibil-
ity constraints. For example, we could assume that the online algorithm knows in advance
the entire set system (with or without the arrival times, but certainly without the values).
Alternatively, the online algorithm could have an oracle to queries of the form “is S a subset
of a feasible set?”. The following Theorem holds with respect to either definition.
Theorem 6. The competitive ratio for Non-monotone Secretary is at most n, and at
least Ω (n/ log∗ n).
Proof. Our algorithm simply selects the first item and completes any feasible set that contains
it. Since it is a uniformly random item, its value is at least OPT/n.
For the lower bound, we instantiate the Hadamard Code with block length n/2. Recall that
it has n/2 codewords and the distance between every two codewords is n/4. Let wi ⊆ [n/2]
denote the i-th codeword, and consider the set Si , wi ∪ {n/2 + i} ⊂ [n]; let the Si’s be the
feasible sets. Set Xn/2+i∗ = 1 for some i
∗, and let all other items have value 0. Call wi∗ the
good codeword, and (n/2 + i∗) is the index of the good item.
In order to achieve value 1, the online algorithm’s selections must be consistent with the
good codeword when the good item arrives. By symmetry, for each i such that the online
algorithm’s selection is consistent with wi when item (n/2 + i) arrives, it has probability 1/n
of obtaining value 1. The expected value of the online algorithm is therefore proportional
to the number of consistent codewords. Let k be a sufficiently large constant (e.g. k =
100). We show that, in expectation, the algorithm is consistent with O (1) codewords whose
items arrive in time periods (k log n, n], O (1) codewords whose items arrive in time periods
(k log log n, k log n], (k log log log n, k log log n], etc.. In total the algorithm is consistent with
O (log∗ n) codewords, so its expected value is O (log∗ n/n), as opposed to value 1 obtained by
the offline algorithm.
With high probability, every two codewords disagree after k log n time periods; i.e. for
every two sets Si, Sj, at least one of the first k log n items is contained in one and not in the
other. Thus after k log n time periods, the online algorithm must commit to one subset Si, so
it only wins if (n/2 + i) is the good item. In particular, for any choices an online algorithm
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may make on the first k log n items, its expected value from the items that come in time
periods (k log n, n] is O (1/n).
Similarly, consider the O (log n) codewords that correspond to items that arrive in time
periods (k log log n, k log n]. After k log log n codewords, we expect that every two of those
O (log n) codewords disagree on some time period. Thus any online algorithm can obtain
expected value at most O (1/n) from items that arrive in time periods (k log log n, k log n].
Same for (k log log log n, k log log n], etc.
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A List of symbols used in Section 2
• OPT - expected (offline) optimum;
• W - set of items selected by the algorithm;
• ℓW , maxi∈W - index of last selected item;
• F - all feasible sets;
• FW - feasible sets that contain W ;
• FW+j , FW∪{j} - feasible sets that contain W ∪ {j};
• Xi - random value for item i;
• V (F ,X[n]) , maxS∈F∑i∈S Xi - value of offline optimum solution;
• zi - observed realization of Xi;
• τ - target value;
• π , Pr [V (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]] - target probability;
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• πj , Pr
V (FW+j,X[n]) > τ | X[j] =
z[ℓW ], 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓW+1,...,j−1
, 1
 - probability of reaching
target value, when j is the next item we select;
• G = G (τ, π,W ) , {j > ℓW : πj ≥ n−2 · π} ∩ (⋃S∈FW S) - set of good and feasible
items;
• A = A (G) ,
(∨
j∈GXj = 1
)
- the good event where at least one of the good items has
a good realization;
• πA , Pr
[(
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ) | (X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]) ∧A] - probability of reaching target
value conditioned on A;
• Aj ,
(
Xj = 1
∧
l<j
l∈G
Xl = 0
)
- the good event where j is the first good item with a good
realization;
• πAj , Pr
[(
V
(FW ,X[n]) > τ) | (X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]) ∧A] - probability of reaching target
value conditioned on Aj ;
• Bj ,
(
Xj = 0
∧
l<j
l∈G
Xl = 0
)
- the bad event where neither j nor any of the preceding
good items have good realizations.
B An Ω (logn/ log log n) lower bound
For completeness, we briefly sketch an Ω (log n/ log log n) lower bound due to [3] for the
competitive ratio in both problems.
Theorem (Essentially [3]). There is an Ω (log n/ log log n) lower bound on the competitive
ratios of Downward-closed Prophet and Downward-Closed Secretary.
Proof sketch. Let the feasible set system be a partition of the n items into disjoint sets of
size log n/ log log n. Let the value of each item be 1 with probability log log n/ log n, and 0
otherwise. With high probability, for at least one of the feasible sets, all items have value 1;
thus the expected offline optimum is approximately log n/ log log n. However, after we select
an item from any feasible set, the expected total value of the remaining items in this set is
less than 1. Thus no online algorithm can achieve expected value more than 2.
C Naive approaches for Downward-Closed Prophet
Our algorithm can be described as follows: wait for an item with value 1, and select it if that
does not decrease the potential function. In this section we informally discuss a few naive
potential functions that seem to fail. In some sense, our final “dynamic” potential function
can be seen as an interpolation between the expectation/median potential function, and the
one based on the probability of beating a fixed target value.
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Recursive potential function The optimal online algorithm recursively selects an item
iff selecting it increases the expected value of the optimal algorithm, where “the optimal
algorithm” is defined recursively. Unfortunately, this recursive structure makes this optimal
function inconvenient to analyze, and in particular difficult to compare to the offline optimum
solution benchmark.
Number of maximal sets Up to poly-logarithmic factors, we can assume without loss of
generality that all items are identically (but not uniformly) distributed over {0, 1}, and that
all maximal sets have the same size. Now, every two maximal sets look the same, so one may
hope that counting the number of feasible maximal sets would give a useful potential function.
However, when the set system has a non-trivial structure, different maximal sets interact very
differently with other sets. In particular, a set that has little or no intersection with other sets
is much more likely to give the best solution, compared to a set that has a large intersection.
For example, consider the following set system: for the first 2n1/3 items, every set of
size n1/3 is a maximal set; as for the remaining (1− o (1))n items, we divide them into
(1− o (1))n5/6 blocks of size n1/6, and maximal sets are all the unions of n1/6 blocks. Set the
probability of each item taking value 1 to n−1/3. Of the first 2n1/3 items, we expect to see
only a constant number of 1’s; from the rest we expect to see approximately n2/3 items with
value 1’s, and there must be a feasible set that contains at least n1/6 of them. So taking one
of the first 2n1/3 items is almost always a bad idea, although there are a lot more of those
sets: (
2n1/3
n1/3
)
= 2Ω(n
1/3) ≫ 2O˜(n1/6) =
(
n5/6
n1/6
)
.
Thus our potential function must take into account the structure of the set system.
Expectation of the current optimum A quantity of interest is the value of an (offline)
optimum solution, among the sets that remain feasible given the items that we have already
selected. This optimum is useful because it easily relates to our benchmark (the optimum
among all sets), it aggregates well both our current commitment to items and the structure of
the set system, and it exhibits some nice statistical properties such as concentration (Theorem
2). The main difficulty is that it is a random variable, and so it is not clear how to extract a
potential function.
The most natural candidate for potential function based on the optimum is its expected
value. If we could show that the expected value of the optimum decreases by at most O (log n)
whenever our algorithm gains 1 from selecting a reasonable item, we would be done. It turns
out that this is not the case. For example, let the maximal feasible sets be {1, . . . , n/2}
and {n/2 + 1, . . . , n}, and let each item be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. The standard
deviation is Θ(
√
n), so when we commit to one of the sets, the expectation goes down by ap-
proximately Θ(
√
n). The same issue arises if we try to use the median instead of expectation.
Probability that the current optimum is greater than the global optimum An-
other way to use the optimum-among-currently-feasible-sets random variable is to consider
the probability that it is greater than some target value, say the global offline optimum, or
(1/ log n) times global optimum. Suppose that we select an item only if selecting it does not
decrease the probability of beating the target value by a factor more than n2; we call such
items good, and bad otherwise. Clearly, if we start from a high probability of beating the target
value, we have a high probability of observing a good item with value 1: together, all the bad
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items cannot account for more than a (1/n)-fraction of the total probability of beating the
target value.
Suppose that every time we select an item, the probability of beating the target value
goes down by a factor of at most n2. After selecting w items, the probability is still at least
n−2w. We can use concentration bounds (such as Theorem 2) to show that if we now subtract
O (w · log n) from the target value, the probability of beating the new target value becomes
high again. This means that as long as the original target value is greater than O (w · log n),
there is still a high probability of observing more 1’s. In some sense, we can think of this
application of concentration bounds as amortizing the decrease of expectation (or median)
over many iterations.
There is a problem with the argument we sketched in the above two paragraphs. In the
first paragraph, we argued that most of the probability of beating the target value comes from
good items. In the second paragraph, we argued that as long as we have not selected enough
items, we expect to observe more 1’s in the future. However these 1’s do not necessarily
correspond to good items. In particular, when the probability of beating the target value
is very low (we quickly reach exponentially low probabilities), the event of observing a good
item with value 1 may account for most of this probability, yet occur with probability much
smaller than 1.
To illustrate the problem, recall the O (log n/ log log n) lower bound instance from Ap-
pendix B. As soon as we observe a 1 on the first item from a feasible subset, we should select
it. Afterward, our probability of observing another 1 in the same interval is approximately
(1− 1/e). Furthermore, we still have a non-trivial chance (roughly 1/n) of beating the global
optimum (Θ(log n/ log log n)). However, we would only maintain a non-zero chance of beating
the global offline optimum if we select one of the first few items - but with probability 1−o (1)
they all have value 0.
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